R. v. Keegstra  3 S.C.R. 697: Reasonable limits --General approach to s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms -- Freedom of expression -- Hate propaganda-- Presumption of innocence -- Reverse onus provision
Present: Dickson C.J. and Wilson, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ALBERTA
Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights -- Freedom of expression -- Hate propaganda -- Criminal Code prohibiting willful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups (s. 319(2)) -- Defense of truth to be established by accused on balance of probabilities (s. 319(3)(a)) -- Whether s. 319(2) of Criminal Code infringes s. 2(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms -- If so, whether infringement justifiable under s. 1 of Charter.
Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights -- Presumption of innocence -- Reverse onus provision -- Criminal Code prohibiting willful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups (s. 319(2)) -- Defense of truth to be established by accused on balance of probabilities (s. 319(3)(a)) --Whether s. 319(3)(a) of Criminal Code infringes s. 11(d) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms -- If so, whether infringement justifiable under s. 1 of Charter.
Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights -- Reasonable limits --General approach to s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The accused, an Alberta high school teacher, was charged under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code with willfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group by communicating anti-semitic statements to his students. Prior to his trial, the accused applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for an order quashing the charge. The court dismissed the application on the ground that s. 319(2) of the Code did not violate freedom of expression as guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court, for want of proper notice to the Crown, did not entertain the accused's argument that s. 319(3)(a) of the Code violated the presumption of innocence protected by s. 11(d) of the Charter. Section 319(3)(a) affords a defense of "truth" to the willful promotion of hatred but only where the accused proves the truth of the communicated statements on a balance of probabilities. The accused was thereafter tried and convicted. On appeal the accused's Charter arguments were accepted, the Court of Appeal holding that ss. 319(2) and 319(3)(a) infringed ss. 2(b) and 11(d) of the Charter respectively, and that the infringements were not justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.
Held (La Forest, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed. Sections 319(2) and 319(3)(a) of the Code are constitutional.
(1) Freedom of Expression
Per Dickson C.J. and Wilson, L'Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ.: Communications which willfully promote hatred against an identifiable group are protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter. When an activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, through a non-violent form of expression, it has expressive content and thus falls within the scope of the word "expression" as found in the guarantee. The type of meaning conveyed is irrelevant. Section 2(b) protects all content of expression. In enacting s. 319(2) of the Code, Parliament sought to prohibit communications which convey meaning. Section 319(2), therefore, represents an infringement of s. 2(b).
Communications which are intended to promote hatred against identifiable groups do not fall within the ambit of a possible s. 2(b) exception concerning expression manifested in a violent form. This exception refers only to expression communicated directly through physical harm. Hate propaganda is not analogous to violence. It conveys a meaning that is repugnant, but the repugnance stems from the content of the message and not from its form. As for threats of violence, they are not excluded from the definition of expression envisioned by s. 2(b).
Sections 15 and 27 of the Charter, which deal with equality and multiculturalism, and the international agreements signed by Canada on the prohibition of racist statements, should not be used to interpret the scope of s. 2(b). It is inappropriate to attenuate the s. 2(b) freedom on the grounds that a particular context so requires. The large and liberal interpretation given to freedom of expression indicates that the preferable course is to weigh the various contextual values and factors in s. 1 of the Charter. This section both guarantees and limits Charter rights and freedoms by reference to principles fundamental in a free and democratic society.
Section 319(2) of the Code constitutes a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression. Parliament's objective of preventing the harm caused by hate propaganda is of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional freedom. Parliament has recognized the substantial harm that can flow from hate propaganda and, in trying to prevent the pain suffered by target group members and to reduce racial, ethnic and religious tension and perhaps even violence in Canada, has decided to suppress the willful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups. Parliament's objective is supported not only by the work of numerous study groups, but also by our collective historical knowledge of the potentially catastrophic effects of the promotion of hatred. Additionally, the international commitment to eradicate hate propaganda and Canada's commitment to the values of equality and multiculturalism in ss. 15 and 27 of the Charter strongly buttress the importance of this objective.
Section 319(2) of the Code is an acceptably proportional response to Parliament's valid objective. There is obviously a rational connection between the criminal prohibition of hate propaganda and the objective of protecting target group members and of fostering harmonious social relations in a community dedicated to equality and multiculturalism. Section 319(2) serves to illustrate to the public the severe reprobation with which society holds messages of hate directed towards racial and religious groups. It makes that kind of expression less attractive and hence decreases acceptance of its content. Section 319(2) is also a means by which the values beneficial to a free and democratic society in particular, the value of equality and the worth and dignity of each human person can be publicized.
Section 319(2) of the Code does not unduly impair freedom of expression. This section does not suffer from overbreadth or vagueness; rather, the terms of the offence indicate that s. 319(2) possesses definitional limits which act as safeguards to ensure that it will capture only expressive activity which is openly hostile to Parliament's objective, and will thus attack only the harm at which the prohibition is targeted. The word "willfully" imports into the offence a stringent standard of mens rea which significantly restricts the reach of s. 319(2) by necessitating the proof of either an intent to promote hatred or knowledge of the substantial certainty of such a consequence. The word "hatred" further reduces the scope of the prohibition. This word, in the context of s. 319(2), must be construed as encompassing only the most severe and deeply felt form of opprobrium. Further, the exclusion of private communications from the scope of s. 319(2), the need for the promotion of hatred to focus upon an identifiable group and the presence of the s. 319(3) defenses, which clarify the scope of s. 319(2), all support the view that the impugned section creates a narrowly confined offence. Section 319(2) is not an excessive impairment of freedom of expression merely because the defense of truth in s. 319(3)(a) does not cover negligent or innocent error as to the truthfulness of a statement. Whether or not a statement is susceptible to classification as true or false, such error should not excuse an accused who has willfully used a statement in order to promote hatred against an identifiable group. Finally, while other non-criminal modes of combating hate propaganda exist, it is eminently reasonable to utilize more than one type of legislative tool in working to prevent the spread of racist expression and its resultant harm. To send out a strong message of condemnation, both reinforcing the values underlying s. 319(2) and deterring the few individuals who would harm target group members and the larger community by communicating hate propaganda, will occasionally require use of the criminal law.
The effects of s. 319(2) are not of such a deleterious nature as to outweigh any advantage gleaned from the limitation of s. 2(b). The expressive activity at which s. 319(2) is aimed constitutes a special category, a category only tenuously connected with the values underlying the guarantee of freedom of expression. Hate propaganda contributes little to the aspirations of Canadians or Canada in either the quest for truth, the promotion of individual self-development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged. Moreover, the narrowly drawn terms of s. 319(2) and its defenses prevent the prohibition of expression lying outside of this narrow category. Consequently, the suppression of hate propaganda represents an impairment of the individual's freedom of expression which is not of a most serious nature.
Per La Forest, Sopinka McLachlin JJ. (dissenting): Section 319(2) of the Code infringes the guarantee of freedom of expression. Where, as in this case, an activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning or message through a non-violent form of expression, this activity falls within the sphere of the conduct protected by s. 2(b). This section protects all content of expression irrespective of the meaning or message sought to be conveyed, no matter how offensive it may be. The government's purpose in enacting s. 319(2) was to restrict freedom of expression by curtailing what people may say. Section 319(2), therefore, imposes a limit on s. 2(b).
The promotion of hatred in this case does not assume a form which falls outside the protected sphere of s. 2(b). The accused's communications were offensive and propagandistic, but they do not constitute threats in the usual sense of that word. The accused's statements did not urge violence against the Jewish people. They were not made with the intention and do not have the effect of compelling Jewish people or anyone else to do one thing or another. Nor do the accused's statements constitute violence. Violence, as discussed in Dolphin Delivery and Irwin Toy, connotes actual or threatened physical interference with the activities of others. Moreover, statements promoting hatred are not akin to threats or violence. There is nothing in the form of such statements which subverts democracy or our basic freedoms in the way in which violence or threats of violence may. Finally, to suggest that speech, like hate propaganda, which undermines the credibility of speakers belonging to particular groups does not fall within s. 2(b) of the Charter, is to remove from the protection of the Charter an enormous amount of speech which has long been accepted as important and valuable.
Sections 15 and 27 of the Charter and the international covenants signed by Canada on the prohibition of racism do not reduce the scope of expression protected by s. 2(b) so as to exclude the accused's statements. First, to do so would be to exclude statements from the protection of s. 2(b) on the basis of their content, an approach which this Court has rejected. Second, given that the protection under s. 2(b) is aimed at protecting individuals from having their expression infringed by the government, it would be a misapplication of Charter values to thereby limit the scope of that individual guarantee with an argument based on s. 15, which is also aimed at circumscribing the power of the state. Third, it would be extremely difficult to balance in the abstract conflicting values such as equality and multiculturalism against freedom of expression. Assuming such balancing were to be done, it would be more appropriately made under s. 1 of the Charter than under s. 2(b). Fourth, Canada's international obligations, and the accords negotiated between international governments, may well be helpful in placing Charter interpretation in a larger context but these obligations are not determinative or limitative of the scope of the Charter guarantees. The provisions of the Charter, though drawing on a political and social philosophy shared with other democratic societies, are uniquely Canadian. As a result, considerations may point, as they do in this case, to a conclusion regarding a rights violation which is not necessarily in accord with those international covenants. Unlike the international covenants, which exclude hate propaganda from the guarantee of speech, the Charter posits a broad and unlimited right of expression under s. 2(b), a right which can only be cut back under s. 1.
Section 2(b) does not protect only justified or meritorious expression. Historical legal limitations on expression which conflict with the larger Canadian conception of free speech must be rejected. While in this case it may be easy to achieve near-unanimous consensus that the statements contribute nothing positive to our society, experience shows that in other cases it may be difficult to draw the line between speech which has value to democracy or social issues and speech which does not. Attempts to confine the guarantee of free expression only to content which is judged to possess redeeming value or to accord with the accepted values strike at the very essence of the value of the freedom, reducing the realm of protected discussion to that which is comfortable and compatible with current conceptions. If the guarantee of free expression is to be meaningful, it must protect expression which challenges even the very basic conceptions about our society. A true commitment to freedom of expression demands nothing less.
Section 319(2) of the Code does not constitute a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression. While the legislative objectives of preventing the promotion of hatred, of avoiding racial violence and of promoting equality and multiculturalism are of sufficient importance to warrant overriding the guarantee of freedom of expression, s. 319(2) fails to meet the proportionality test.
Section 319(2) does, to some degree, further Parliament's objective. However, the rational connection between s. 319(2) and its goals is tenuous as there is not a strong and evident connection between the criminalization of hate propaganda and its suppression. Section 319(2) may in fact detract from the objectives it is designed to promote by deterring legitimate expression. Law-abiding citizens, who do not wish to run afoul of the law, could decide not to take the chance in a doubtful case. Creativity and the beneficial exchange of ideas could be adversely affected. At the same time, it is unclear that s. 319(2) provides an effective way of curbing hate-mongers. Not only does the criminal process attract extensive media coverage and confer on the accused publicity for his dubious causes, it may even bring him sympathy.
Section 319(2) of the Code does not interfere as little as possible with freedom of expression. Section 319(2) is drafted too broadly, catching more expressive conduct than can be justified by the objectives of promoting social harmony and individual dignity. The term "hatred" in s. 319(2) is capable of denoting a wide range of diverse emotions and is highly subjective, making it difficult to ensure that only cases meriting prosecution are pursued and that only those whose conduct is calculated to dissolve the social bonds of society are convicted. Despite the requirement of "willful promotion", people who make statements primarily for non-nefarious reasons may also be convicted under s. 319(2). A belief that what one says about a group is true and important to political and social debate is quite compatible with, and indeed may inspire, an intention to promote active dislike of that group. Such a belief is equally compatible with foreseeing that promotion of such dislike may stem from one's statements. The absence of any requirement that actual harm or incitement to hatred be shown further broadens the scope of s. 319(2), and it is unclear, in practice, if the s. 319(3) defenses, including the defense of truth, significantly narrow the ambit of s. 319(2). Moreover, not only is the category of speech caught by s. 319(2) defined broadly, the application of the definition of offending speech i.e., the circumstances in which the offending statements are prohibited is virtually unlimited. Only private conversations are exempt from state scrutiny. Given the vagueness of the prohibition of expression in s. 319(2), there is again a danger that the legislation may have a chilling effect on legitimate activities important to our society by subjecting innocent persons to constraints born out of a fear of the criminal process. Finally, the process by which the prohibition is effected -- the criminal law -- is the severest our society can impose and is arguably unnecessary given the availability of alternate and more appropriate and effective remedies.
Any questionable benefit conferred by s. 319(2) of the Code is outweighed by the significant infringement on the guarantee of freedom of expression. Section 319(2) does not merely regulate the form or tone of expression, it strikes directly at its content. It is capable of catching not only statements like those at issue in this case, but works of art and the intemperate statement made in the heat of social controversy. While few may actually be prosecuted to conviction under s. 319(2) and imprisoned, many fall within the shadow of its broad prohibition. Section 319(2) touches on the vital values upon which s. 2(b) of the Charter rests: the value of fostering a vibrant and creative society through the marketplace of ideas; the value of the vigorous and open debate essential to democratic government and preservation of our rights and freedoms; and the value of a society which fosters the self-actualization and freedom of its members. An infringement of this seriousness can only be justified by a countervailing state interest of the most compelling nature. However, the claims of gains to be achieved at the cost of the infringement of free speech represented by s. 319(2) are tenuous. Indeed, it is difficult to see how s. 319(2) fosters the goals of social harmony and individual dignity.
(2) Presumption of Innocence
Per Dickson C.J. and Wilson, L'Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ.: Section 319(3)(a) of the Code, which provides that no person shall be convicted of willfully promoting hatred "if he establishes that the statements communicated were true", infringes the presumption of innocence guaranteed in s. 11(d) of the Charter. The real concern under s. 11(d) is not whether the accused must disprove an element of the offence or prove a defense. What is decisive is the final effect of the impugned provision on the verdict. If, as in this case, an accused is required to prove some fact on a balance of probabilities to avoid conviction, the impugned provision violates the presumption of innocence because it permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the guilt of the accused.
Section 319(3)(a) of the Code constitutes a reasonable limit on the presumption of innocence. Parliament's objective in employing a reverse onus is pressing and substantial. The objective behind s. 319(3)(a) is closely connected with the purpose of s. 319(2). Harm is created whenever statements are made with the intention of promoting hatred, whether or not they contain an element of truth. If the defense of truth is too easily used, Parliament's objective under s. 319(2) will suffer unduly. It is therefore in the furtherance of that same objective that truthfulness must be proved by the accused on a balance of probabilities.
Section 319(3)(a) meets the proportionality test. First, the section has a rational connection to the purpose of preventing the harm caused by hate propaganda. The reverse onus in the truth defense operates so as to make it more difficult to avoid conviction where the willful promotion of hatred has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the section also represents a minimal impairment of the presumption of innocence. By requiring the accused to prove that his statements are true on a balance of probabilities, Parliament made a concession to the importance of truth in freedom of expression values without excessively compromising the effectiveness of s. 319(2). Any less onerous burden would severely skew the equilibrium. Third, the importance of preventing the harm caused by hate propaganda is not outweighed by Parliament's infringement of s. 11(d). The reverse onus found in the truth defense represents the only way in which the defense can be offered while still enabling Parliament to prohibit hate propaganda effectively through criminal legislation; to require that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt the falsity of a statement would excuse much of the harmful expressive activity caught by s. 319(2) despite minimal proof as to its worth.
Per Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. (dissenting): Section 319(3)(a) of the Code infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter. Under s. 319(2), where the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused willfully promoted hatred against an identifiable group, the accused will escape liability if, under s. 319(3)(a), he "establishes that the statements communicated were true". By placing the burden of establishing the truth of the statements on the accused, Parliament has contravened the basic principle that the accused need not prove a defense. When an accused is required to prove some fact on a balance of probabilities to avoid conviction, the provision violates the presumption of innocence because it permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the guilt of the accused.
Section 319(3)(a) of the Code does not constitute a reasonable limit upon the right to be presumed innocent. The section lacks the required degree of proportionality. It is difficult to discern a rational connection between the aims of s. 319(3)(a) and its requirement that the accused prove the truth of his statements. Further, s. 319(3)(a) does not impair s. 11(d) as little as possible. Because of its superior resources, the state is in a better position than the accused to determine whether or not a statement is true or false. If such a determination is impossible, it should not be ruled out that the statements could be more valuable than harmful. These considerations suggest that s. 319(3)(a)'s infringement of the presumption of innocence is neither minimal nor, given the importance of the infringement in the context of prosecutions under s. 319(2), sufficient to outweigh the dubious benefit of such a provision. Parliament intended the truth to be a defense and falsehood to be an important element of the offence created by s. 319(2). That fact, coupled with the centrality of the presumption of innocence in our criminal law, indicates that only a countervailing state interest of the most compelling kind could justify the infringement. It is difficult to see, however, what benefits s. 319(2) in fact produces in terms of stemming hate propaganda and promoting social harmony and individual dignity.
Per La Forest J. (dissenting): It is unnecessary to consider the issues respecting the right to be presumed innocent in s. 11(d) of the Charter.
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