The Canadian Supreme Court has abandoned the similarly situated test in favour of an approach that focuses attention on the content of the law, its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies, and also to those whom it excludes from application. This test was set out in the following case:
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia  1 S.C.R. 143: Whether the Canadian citizenship requirement for admission to the British Columbia bar infringed or denied the equality rights
The respondent Andrews, a British subject permanently resident in Canada met all the requirements for admission to the British Columbia bar except that of Canadian citizenship. His action for a declaration that that requirement violated s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was dismissed at trial but allowed on appeal. Kinersly, an American citizen who was at the time a permanent resident of Canada articling in the Province of British Columbia, was added as a co-respondent by order of this Court. The constitutional questions before this Court dealt with: (1) whether the Canadian citizenship requirement for admission to the British Columbia bar infringed or denied the equality rights guaranteed by s. 15(1) of the Charter; (2) if so, whether that infringement was justified by s. 1.
Section 15(1) of the Charter
Per Dickson C.J. and McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ.: Section 15(1) of the Charter provides for every individual a guarantee of equality before and under the law, as well as the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination. This is not a general guarantee of equality; its focus is on the application of the law. No problem regarding the scope of the word "law" arose in this case because legislation was under attack.
The "similarly situated should be similarly treated" approach will not necessarily result in equality nor will every distinction or differentiation in treatment necessarily result in inequality. The words "without discrimination" in s. 15 are crucial.
Discrimination is a distinction which, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, has an effect which imposes disadvantages not imposed upon others or which withholds or limits access to advantages available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an (page 145) individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.
Generally, the principles applied under the Human Rights Acts are equally applicable to questions of discrimination under s. 15(1). However, the Charter requires a two-step approach to s. 15(1). The first step is to determine whether or not an infringement of a guaranteed right has occurred. The second step is to determine whether, if there has been an infringement, it can be justified under s. 1. The two steps must be kept analytically distinct because of the different attribution of the burden of proof; the citizen must establish the infringement of his or her Charter right and the state must justify the infringement.
The grounds of discrimination enumerated in s. 15(1) are not exhaustive. Grounds analogous to those enumerated are also covered and the section may be even broader than that although it is not necessary to answer that question in this case since the ground advanced in this case falls into the analogous category.
The words "without discrimination" require more than a mere finding of distinction between the treatment of groups or individuals. These words are a form of qualifier built into s. 15 itself and limit those distinctions which are forbidden by the section to those which involve prejudice or disadvantage. The effect of the impugned distinction or classification on the complainant must be considered. Given that not all distinctions and differentiations created by law are discriminatory, a complainant under s. 15(1) must show not only that he or she is not receiving equal treatment before and under the law or that the law has a differential impact on him or her in the protection or benefit of the law but must show in addition that the law is discriminatory.
A rule which bars an entire class of persons from certain forms of employment, solely on the grounds of a lack of citizenship status and without consideration of educational and professional qualifications or the other attributes or merits of individuals in the group, infringes s. 15 equality rights. Section 42 of the Barristers and Solicitors Act is such a rule.
Wilson J at 168: I would also agree with the following criticism of the similarly situated test made by Kerans J.A. in Mahe v. Alta. (Gov't) (1987), 54 Alta. L.R. (2d) 212, at p. 244:
. . . the test accepts an idea of equality which is almost mechanical, with no scope for considering the reason for the distinction. In consequence, subtleties are found to justify a finding of dissimilarity which reduces the test to a categorization game. Moreover, the test is not helpful. After all, most laws are enacted for the specific purpose of offering a benefit or imposing a burden on some persons and not on others. The test catches every conceivable difference in legal treatment.
For the reasons outlined above, the test cannot be accepted as a fixed rule or formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under the Charter. Consideration must be given to the content of the law, to its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies, and also upon those whom it excludes from its application. The issues which will arise from case to case are such that it would be wrong to attempt to confine these considerations within such a fixed and limited formula.
It is not every distinction or differentiation in treatment at law which will transgress the equality guarantees of s. 15 of the Charter. It is, of course, obvious that legislatures may -- and to govern effectively -- must treat different individuals and groups in different ways. Indeed, such distinctions are one of the main preoccupations of legislatures. The classifying of individuals and groups, the making of different provisions respecting such groups, the application of different rules, regulations, requirements and qualifications to different persons is necessary for the governance of modern (page 169) society. As noted above, for the accommodation of differences, which is the essence of true equality, it will frequently be necessary to make distinctions.
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