EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT ET
AL., v. WILLIAM KIRBY ET AL.,
777 S.W.2d 391
OPINIONBY: MAUZY
At issue is the
constitutionality of the Texas system for financing the education of public school
children. Edgewood Independent School District, sixty-seven other school districts, and
numerous individual school children and parents filed suit seeking a declaration that the
Texas school financing system violates the Texas Constitution. The trial court rendered
judgment to that effect and declared that the system violates the Texas Constitution,
article I, section 3, article I, section 19, and article VII, section 1. We
affirm
the trial court.
The only question is whether
those facts describe a public school financing system that meets the requirements of the
Constitution. As summarized and excerpted, the facts are as follows.
There are approximately three
million public school children in Texas. The legislature finances the education of these
children through a combination of revenues supplied by the state itself and revenues
supplied by local school districts which are governmental subdivisions of the state. Of
total education costs, the state provides about forty-two percent, school districts
provide about fifty percent, and the remainder comes from various other sources including
federal funds. School districts derive revenues from local ad valorem property taxes, and
the state raises funds from a variety of sources including the sales tax and various
severance and excise taxes.
There are glaring disparities in
the abilities of the various school districts to raise revenues from property taxes
because taxable property wealth varies greatly from district to district. The wealthiest
district has over $ 14,000,000 of property wealth per student, while the poorest has
approximately $ 20,000; this disparity reflects a 700 to 1 ratio. The 300,000 students in
the lowest-wealth schools have less than 3% of the state's property wealth to support
their education while the 300,000 students in the highest-wealth schools have over 25% of the state's property
wealth; thus the 300,000 students in the wealthiest
districts have more than eight times the property value to support their education as the
300,000 students in the poorest districts.
The state has tried for many
years to lessen the disparities through various efforts to supplement the poorer
districts. Through the Foundation School Program, the state currently attempts to ensure
that each district has sufficient funds to provide its students with at least a basic
education. Under this program, state aid is distributed to the various districts according
to a complex formula such that property-poor districts receive more state aid than do
property-rich districts. However, the Foundation School Program does not cover even the
cost of meeting the state-mandated minimum requirements. Most importantly, there are no
Foundation School Program allotments for school
facilities or for debt service. For these reasons and more, almost all school districts
spend additional local funds.
Because of the disparities in
district property wealth, spending per student varies widely, ranging from $ 2,112 to
$19,333. Under the existing system, an average of $ 2,000 more per year is spent on each
of the 150,000 students in the wealthiest districts than is spent on the 150,000 students
in the poorest districts.
The lower expenditures in the
property-poor districts are not the result of lack of tax effort. Generally, the
property-rich districts can tax low and spend high while the property-poor districts must
tax high merely to spend low. In 1985-86, local tax rates ranged from $.09 to $ 1.55 per $
100 valuation. The 100 poorest districts had an average tax rate of 74.5 cents and spent
an average of $ 2,978 per student. The 100 wealthiest districts had an average tax rate of
47 cents and spent an average of $ 7,233 per student.
Property-poor districts are
trapped in a cycle of poverty from which there is no opportunity to free themselves.
Because of their inadequate tax base, they must tax at significantly higher rates in order
to meet minimum requirements for accreditation; yet their educational programs are
typically inferior. The location of new industry and development is strongly influenced by tax rates and the quality
of local schools. Thus, the property-poor districts with their high tax rates and inferior
schools are unable to attract new industry or development and so have little opportunity
to improve their tax base.
The amount of money spent on a
student's education has a real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity
offered that student. High-wealth districts are able to provide for their students broader
educational experiences including more extensive curricula, more up-to-date technological
equipment, better libraries and library personnel, teacher aides, counseling services,
lower student-teacher ratios, better facilities, parental involvement programs, and
drop-out prevention programs. They are also better able to attract and retain experienced
teachers and administrators.
The differences in the quality of
educational programs offered are dramatic. For example, San Elizario I.S.D. offers no
foreign language, no pre-kindergarten program, no chemistry, no physics, no calculus, and
no college preparatory or honors program. It also offers virtually no extra-curricular
activities such as band, debate, or football. At the time of trial, one-third of Texas
school districts did not even meet the state-mandated standards for maximum class size.
The great majority of these are low-wealth districts. In many instances, wealthy and poor
districts are found contiguous to one another within the same county.
Article VII, section 1 of the
Texas Constitution provides: A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public
free schools.
The court of appeals declined to
address petitioners' challenge under this provision and concluded instead that its
interpretation was a "political question." We disagree. This is not an area in
which the Constitution vests exclusive discretion in the legislature; rather the language
of article VII, section 1 imposes on the legislature an affirmative duty to establish and
provide for the public free schools. This duty is not committed unconditionally to the
legislature's discretion, but instead is accompanied by standards. By express
constitutional mandate, the legislature must make "suitable" provision for an
"efficient" system for the "essential" purpose of a "general
diffusion of knowledge." While these are admittedly not precise terms, they do
provide a standard by which this court must, when called upon to do so, measure the
constitutionality of the legislature's actions. We do not undertake this responsibility
lightly and we begin with a presumption of constitutionality.
If the system is not
"efficient" or not "suitable," the legislature has not discharged its
constitutional duty and it is our duty to say so. The Texas Constitution derives its force
from the people of Texas. This is the fundamental law under which the people of this state
have consented to be governed. In construing the language of article VII, section 1, we
consider "the intent of the people who adopted it. We seek its meaning with the
understanding that the Constitution was ratified to function as an organic document to
govern society and institutions as they evolve through time.
[the court considers the meaning
of efficient]
While there is some evidence that
many delegates wanted an economical school system, there is no persuasive evidence that
the delegates used the term "efficient" to achieve that end. It must be
recognized that the Constitution requires an "efficient," not an
"economical," "inexpensive," or "cheap"
system."Efficient" conveys the meaning of effective or productive of results and
connotes the use of resources so as to produce results with little waste; this meaning does not appear to have changed over time.
Considering "the general
spirit of the times and the prevailing sentiments of the people," it is apparent from
the historical record that those who drafted and ratified article VII, section 1 never
contemplated the possibility that such gross inequalities could exist within an
"efficient" system.
[court considers evidence that
the constitutional delegates intended an equitable educational system]
We conclude that, in mandating
"efficiency," the constitutional framers and ratifiers did not intend a system
with such vast disparities as now exist. Instead, they stated clearly that the purpose of
an efficient system was to provide for a"general diffusion of knowledge." The
present system, by contrast, provides not for a diffusion that is general, but for one that is limited and
unbalanced. The resultant inequalities are thus directly contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency.
The State argues that the 1883
constitutional amendment of article VII, section 3 expressly authorizes the present
financing system. However, we conclude that this provision was intended not to preclude an
efficient system but to serve as a a vehicle for injecting more money into an efficient
system.
In the context of article VII,
section 1, the legislature has expressed its understanding of the term
"efficient" for a long time even though it has never given the term full effect.
Sixty years ago, the legislature enacted the Rural Aid Appropriations Act with the express
purpose of "equalizing the educational opportunities afforded by the State. Not
only the legislature, but also this court has previously recognized the implicit link that
the Texas Constitution establishes between efficiency and equality. [We have stated] that
rural aid appropriations "have a real relationship to the subject of equalizing
educational opportunities in the state, and tend to make our system more efficient.
."
By statutory directives, the
legislature has attempted through the years to reduce disparities and improve the system.
There have been good faith efforts on the part of many public officials, and some progress
has been made. However, as the undisputed facts of this case make painfully clear, the
reality is that the constitutional mandate has not been met.
The legislature's recent efforts
have focused primarily on increasing the state's contributions. More money allocated under
the present system would reduce some of the existing disparities between districts but
would at best only postpone the reform that is necessary to make the system efficient. A
band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be changed.
There must be a direct and close
correlation between a district's tax effort and the educational resources available to it;
in other words, districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per
pupil at similar levels of tax effort. Children who live in poor districts and children
who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have
access to educational funds. Certainly, this much is required if the state is to educate
its populace efficiently and provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide.
In setting appropriations, the
legislature must establish priorities according to constitutional mandate; equalizing
educational opportunity cannot be relegated
to an "if funds are left over" basis. We recognize that there are and always
will be strong public interests competing for available state funds. However, the
legislature's responsibility to support public education is different because it is
constitutionally imposed. Whether the legislature acts directly or enlists local
government to help meet its obligation, the end product must still be what the
constitution commands -- i.e. an efficient system of public free schools throughout the
state.
Some have argued that reform in
school finance will eliminate local control, but this argument has no merit. An efficient
system does not preclude the ability of communities to exercise local control over the
education of their children. It requires only that the funds available for education be
distributed equitably and evenly. An efficient system will actually allow for more local
control, not less. It will provide property-poor districts with economic alternatives that
are not now available to them. Only if alternatives are indeed available can a community
exercise the control of making choices.
Although we have ruled the school
financing system to be unconstitutional, we do not now instruct the legislature as to the
specifics of the legislation it should enact; nor do we order it to raise taxes. The
legislature has primary responsibility to decide how best to achieve an efficient system.
We decide only the nature of the constitutional mandate and whether that mandate has been
met.
Because we hold that the mandate
of efficiency has not been met, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. The
legislature is duty-bound to provide for an efficient system of education, and only if the
legislature fulfills that duty can we launch this great state into a strong economic
future with educational opportunity for all. Because
of the enormity of the task now facing the legislature and because we want to avoid any
sudden disruption in the educational processes, we modify the trial court's judgment so as
to stay the effect of its injunction until May 1, 1990. However, let there be no
misunderstanding. A remedy is long overdue. The legislature must take immediate action. We
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment as
modified.