Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers)  2 S.C.R. 557: Securities Commission -- Commission part of larger regulatory framework -- No privative clause and right of appeal -- Appropriate standard of review of Commission's decisions
Present: Lamer C.J. and La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA
Administrative law -- Judicial review -- Securities Commission -- Commission part of larger regulatory framework -- No privative clause and right of appeal -- Appropriate standard of review of Commission's decisions -- Whether standard properly applied -- Securities Act, S.B.C. 1985, c. 83, ss. 1(1) "material change", "material fact", 14(1), (2), 44(1), 45(2), 49(1), 50(1), 67, 68, 144(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), 149(a), (b), (c), 154.2.
Securities -- Securities Commission -- Statutory duty on issuers of stock to disclose nature and substance of material change -- Prohibition against insider trading -- Series of transactions allegedly breaching duty to disclose -- Whether transactions breaching duty to disclose and/or prohibition against insider trading.
Respondents were, respectively, the chair of the board, the vice president responsible for internal administration and the president of Prime, a company holding several wholly owned subsidiaries and controlling or managing about 50 public junior resource companies. Respondents were also directors of Calpine, a company controlled and managed by Prime. Both companies were reporting issuers listed on the Vancouver Stock Exchange and subject to the VSE's rules and policies concerning public disclosure of information and pricing of options. Both were subject to the continuing and timely disclosure requirements under s. 67 of the Securities Act and to the insider trading provisions under s. 68. The British Columbia Securities Commission administers the Act and ensures compliance with its requirements. It also regulates the VSE.
In the spring of 1990, the Superintendent of Brokers (the Commission's chief administrative officer) instituted proceedings against the respondents in connection with various types of transactions which occurred between July and October, 1989. The Superintendent alleged that the respondents had violated the timely disclosure provisions and insider trading provisions in three categories of impugned transactions: the drilling results and share options transactions, the private placement, and the ALC withdrawal. Respondents were prevented from having information relative to assay results by a "Chinese Wall".
In the first category, Prime or Calpine allegedly failed to disclose all material changes in four transactions in that assay results were publicly disclosed after the company had granted or repriced options. The fifth option transaction, although made after a detailed news release of assay results, allegedly violated a pricing formula under the VSE options policy.
The second series of impugned transactions involved the private placement of Calpine units. Calpine allegedly failed to disclose, contrary to s. 67, that Prime was the purchaser and that the sale significantly increased Prime's interest in Calpine. It was also alleged that Calpine had misled the VSE as to the firm brokering the private placement.
The third impugned transaction occurred when a broker disputed its contractual obligation either to find a purchaser or to buy a set number of Prime units on offer following the withdrawal of a firm (ALC) from a deal to purchase them. Prime was alleged to have violated s. 67 by not making timely and adequate disclosure of the dispute following ALC's withdrawal.
The Commission concluded that the respondents contravened s. 67 of the Act by failing to disclose material changes in their affairs. No insider trading contrary to s. 68 of the Act was found, however. The respondents were found responsible for these breaches as senior managers of the companies, were suspended from trading in shares for one year and were required to pay part of the costs incurred by the Commission and Superintendent. Respondents' appeal was limited to whether the Commission had erred as a matter of law in its conclusions on s. 67 (disclosure of material change), s. 144 (power of Commission to make orders) and s. 154.2 (power of Commission to make orders regarding costs) of the Act. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Commission's orders. The Superintendent and the Commission now appeal from that decision.
These appeals dealt mainly with the appropriate standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a decision of a securities commission which is not protected by a privative clause when there exists a statutory right of appeal and where the case turns on a question of statutory interpretation. The appeals also raised issues of compliance with the timely disclosure requirements under applicable securities legislation.
Held: The appeals should be allowed.
The Securities Act is part of a much larger framework which regulates the securities industry throughout Canada primarily for the protection of the investor but also for capital market efficiency and ensuring public confidence in the system.
The central question in ascertaining the standard of review is to determine the legislative intent in conferring jurisdiction on the administrative tribunal. The analysis must consider the tribunal's role or function, whether the agency's decisions are protected by a privative clause, and whether the question goes to the tribunal's jurisdiction. The courts have developed a spectrum that ranges from the standard of patent unreasonableness (where deference is at its highest, for example, where a tribunal is protected by a privative clause in deciding a matter within its jurisdiction) to that of correctness (where deference is at its lowest, for example, where there is a statutory right of appeal or where the issue concerns the interpretation of a provision limiting the tribunal's jurisdiction). The case at bar falls between these two extremes. On one hand lies a statutory right of appeal pursuant to s. 149 of the Securities Act. On the other lies an appeal from a highly specialized tribunal on an issue which arguably goes to the core of its regulatory mandate and expertise. Even where there is no privative clause and where there is a statutory right of appeal, the concept of the specialization of duties requires that deference be shown to decisions of specialized tribunals on matters which fall squarely within the tribunal's expertise.
The breadth of the Commission's expertise and specialisation is reflected in the provisions of the Securities Act. The Commission is responsible for the administration of the Act, has broad powers with respect to investigations, audits, hearings and orders, and any decision, when filed in the Supreme Court of British Columbia Registry, has the force and effect of a decision of that court. The Commission has the power to revoke or vary any of its decisions. It also has a very broad discretion to determine what is in the public's interest. The definitions in the Act exist in a factual or regulatory context and must be analysed in context, not in isolation. This is yet another basis for curial deference. A higher degree of judicial deference is also warranted with respect to a tribunal's interpretation of the law where it plays a role in policy development. Here, the Commission's primary role is to administer and apply the Act. It also plays a policy development role but its policies are not to be treated as legal pronouncements absent statutory authority mandating such treatment. Thus, on precedent, principle and policy, those decisions of the Commission falling within its expertise generally warrant judicial deference.
Sections 67, 144 and 154.2 of Act were specifically considered with an eye to the tribunal's expertise and its need for deference. The decision to make an order and the precise nature of that order, under s. 144, as well as any decision obliging a person to pay the costs of a hearing necessitated by his or her conduct, pursuant to s. 154.2, are clearly within the jurisdiction and expertise of the Commission. The other provision at issue was s. 67 which involves an interpretation of the words "material change" and "as soon as practicable".
Both "material change" and "material fact" are defined in s. 1 of the Act. They are defined in terms of the significance of their impact on the market price or value of the securities of an issuer. The definition of "material fact" is broader than that of "material change"; it encompasses any fact that can "reasonably be expected to significantly affect" the market price or value of the securities of an issuer, and not only changes "in the business, operations, assets or ownership of the issuer" that would reasonably be expected to have such an effect.
This case turned partly on the definition of "material change". Three elements emerge from that definition: the change must be (a) "in relation to the affairs of an issuer", (b) "in the business, operations, assets or ownership of the issuer" and (c) material, i.e., would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of the securities of the issuer. Not all changes are material changes; the latter are set in the context of making sure that issuers keep investors up to date. The determination of what information should be disclosed is an issue which goes to the heart of the regulatory expertise and mandate of the Commission, i.e., regulating the securities markets in the public's interest.
This case also turns on the meaning of the words "as soon as practicable", in s. 67 of the Act, as to when a material change should be disclosed to the public. The timeliness of disclosure also falls within the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction.
Given the nature of the securities industry, the Commission's specialization of duties and policy development role, and the nature of the problem before the court, considerable deference was warranted in the present case notwithstanding the facts that there was a statutory right of appeal and that there was no privative clause.
The determination of what constitutes a material change for the purposes of general disclosure under s. 67 of the Act falls squarely within the regulatory mandate and expertise of the Commission. New information relating to a mining property (which is an asset) bears significantly on the question of that property's value. A change in assay and drilling results can amount to a material change as was the case here.
The obligation to disclose "as soon as practicable" takes on a different meaning when an issuer is about to engage in a securities transaction. Although a duty to inquire is not expressly stated in s. 67, such an interpretation contextualizes the general obligation to disclose material changes and guarantees the fairness of the market, which is the underlying goal of the Act. The Commission had jurisdiction to interpret s. 67 in this manner and was entitled to the court's deference.
A duty to inquire under s. 67 is not incompatible with the Act's insider trading provision (s. 68). If an issuer wishes to engage in a securities transaction, its directors must inquire about all material changes in the issuer's affairs. Consequently, the directors will have, at one point in time, knowledge of undisclosed material facts and material changes which constitute inside information. As long as the material facts and material changes are adequately disclosed prior to the transaction, there will be no possibility of insider trading. The directors' duty to inquire about material changes is not erased by the erection of a Chinese Wall because the disclosure requirements under s. 67 are on the issuer.
Each of the Commission's findings were supported by overwhelming evidence and should not be disturbed. The Commission concluded that information contained in drilling results can constitute a material change in a reporting issuer's affairs and that s. 67 imposes a duty on senior management to inquire as to the existence of material changes before causing a reporting issuer to engage in a securities transaction. It found that the respondents breached s. 67 by failing to disclose various material changes in the affairs of Prime and Calpine before causing these two companies to engage in securities transactions. The Commission also concluded that the non-disclosure of information concerning the private placement issue and the withdrawal of ALC constituted a failure to disclose a material change. Although the material change arising from the controversy surrounding the withdrawal of ALC was self-evident, not all material changes are self-evident.
Section 144 of the Act gives the Commission a broad discretion to make orders that it considers to be in the public interest. Thus, a reviewing court should not disturb an order of the Commission unless the Commission has made some error in principle in exercising its discretion or has exercised its discretion in a capricious or vexatious manner.
The Commission exercised its discretion in a judicial manner. Further, it could make the orders it did with respect to the respondents even though the duty to make timely disclosure under s. 67 of the Act applies to a "reporting issuer". Although responsibility for timely disclosure is vested in the reporting issuer, effective responsibility rests with the senior officers and the directors of the reporting issuer. In addition, s. 144 of the Act not only gives the Commission a broad power to make orders it considers to be in the public interest but also confers upon the Commission the authority to make orders with respect to "a person". The Commission's order with respect to costs was well within its jurisdiction; considerable deference was in order.
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