Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)  1 S.C.R. 236: Standing -- Public interest group -- Immigration Act amendments making provisions with respect to determination of refugee status more stringent -- Public interest group active in work amongst refugees and immigrants -- Action commenced to challenge constitutionality of Act under the Charter -- Whether standing should be granted to challenge provisions --
Present: La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, Stevenson and Iacobucci JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
Standing -- Public interest group -- Immigration Act amendments making provisions with respect to determination of refugee status more stringent -- Public interest group active in work amongst refugees and immigrants -- Action commenced to challenge constitutionality of Act under the Charter -- Whether standing should be granted to challenge provisions -- Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, as am. by S.C. 1988, c. 35 and c. 36 -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7.
The Canadian Council of Churches is a federal corporation which represents the interests of a broad group of member churches including the protection and resettlement of refugees. The Council had expressed its concerns about the refugee determination process in the proposed amendments to the Immigration Act, 1976 (which later came into force on January 1, 1989) to members of the government and to the parliamentary committees considering the legislation. These amendments changed the procedures for determining whether applicants came within the definition of a Convention Refugee.
The Council sought a declaration that many, if not most, of the amended provisions violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights. The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to strike out the claim on the basis that the Council did not have standing to bring the action and had not demonstrated a cause of action. The application to strike out was dismissed at trial but to a large extent was granted on appeal. Appellant appealed and respondents cross-appealed. At issue here is whether the appellant should be granted status to proceed with an action challenging, almost in its entirety, the validity of the amended Immigration Act, 1976.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed; the cross-appeal should be allowed.
Recognition of the need to grant public interest standing, whether because of the importance of public rights or the need to conform with the Constitution Act, 1982, in some circumstances does not amount to a blanket approval to grant standing to all who wish to litigate an issue. A balance must be struck between ensuring access to the courts and preserving judicial resources. The courts must not be allowed to become hopelessly overburdened as a result of the unnecessary proliferation of marginal or redundant suits brought by well-meaning organizations pursuing their own particular cases.
Status has been granted to prevent the immunization of legislation or public acts from any challenge. Public interest standing, however, is not required when it can be shown on a balance of probabilities that the measure will be subject to attack by a private litigant. The principles for granting public standing set forth by this Court, while they should be given a liberal and generous interpretation, need not and should not be expanded.
Three aspects of the claim must be considered when public interest standing is sought. First, is there a serious issue raised as to the invalidity of legislation in question? Second, has it been established that the plaintiff is directly affected by the legislation or, if not, does the plaintiff have a genuine interest in its validity? Third, is there another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the Court?
Although the claim at issue made a sweeping attack on most of the many amendments to the Act, some serious issues as to the validity of the legislation were raised. Appellant had a genuine interest in this field. Each refugee claimant, however, has standing to initiate a constitutional challenge to secure his or her own rights under the Charter and the disadvantages faced by refugees as a group do not preclude their effective access to the court. Many refugee claimants can and have appealed administrative decisions under the statute and each case presented a clear concrete factual background upon which the decision of the court could be based. The possibility of the imposition of a 72-hour removal order against refugee claimants does not undermine their ability to challenge the legislative scheme. The Federal Court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against a removal order. Given the average length of time required for an ordinary case to reach the initial "credible basis" hearing, there is more than adequate time for a claimant to prepare to litigate the possible rejection of the claim.
| Return to Topic Menu | Return to Main Menu |